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The August crisis of 1998 had a devastating effect on financial markets in Russia. Russia
announced a default on foreign debt payments for the three-month period (and is still
having a difficult time meeting them), while the short-term debt was fully and unilaterally
restructured towards long-term debt. In one year's time, the market volume of the Russian
Trading System (RTS) stock market exchange has plunged from $70 billion to a mere $5
billion.
The 1998 financial crisis is reminiscent of another crisis in 1989-1990 when Russia was
still a part of the Soviet Union. Ten years of reform, first towards a socialist market economy
and then to a market economy, have focused on an irreversible change in Russian economy
and policy. In this paper we try to assess some of the gains and losses of the first decade of
transition. We argue that, while democracy is still at risk in Russia, a Russian citizen has
matured as a voter, a consumer, and an investor. Political and economic progress, however,
are still hampered by the poor and criminalized state of business and political spheres. Russia
badly needs a president, parliament, and government having the will and power to face the
country's tremendous challenges. The maturation of the electorate provides for a better
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chance to reach a social contract now than ever existed a decade ago. Reforms and transition
in Russia remain primarily a political challenge.
The Russian government's announcement on August 17, 1998, in which it conceded
default on the sovereign debt, managed to surprise the international community. Indeed,
indicators of macroeconomic stability had appeared strong in 1997, although somewhat
undermined by ineffective policy implemented by the successive Prime Ministers Cher-
nomyrdin and Kirienko and their governments. The Russian collapse could not have oc-
curred at a more inopportune time. Many financial institutions around the world were still
struggling with aftershocks from the Asian crisis, debt restructuring and shifting specula-
tion. Nonetheless, once the card was played, it was a formidable reality to be dealt with.
Internally, the situation would be costly both in a literal and in a figurative sense. It would
mean lawyers, conferences and evaluations of what assets might be salvaged and by whom.
Where would surplus money materialize for the emergency rescue: from a different budget
or from a camouflaged crisis account in some other part of the world?
Whether any such "secret funds" existed or not, whether or not the government was
brought to the figurative wall, is really beside the point. What matters is that Russian
decision-makers chose the now documented "mild" devaluation-restructuring of the GKO
(Treasury bills) and OFZ (term-bond) markets package, proposing a planned three-month
freeze-before-repayment arrangement. These ineffective decisions revealed to the world,
in full light, the magnitude of Russia's malady. Reflexively, public and financial realms began
trying to save what they could, which only led to a steeper downward spiral for Russia from
mid-August until the end of September, followed again by a smaller peak in December
1998. Brazil followed Russia and defaulted only a few months later.
Russian citizens absorbed the news of the crash with disbelief. In a country synonymous
with secrecy, they had believed some alternative would be found; some miracle would hap-
pen; the government would ultimately be able to avoid default. Prior to the collapse, per-
centages on savings accounts had been absurdly attractive, and GKO bonds were due to
mature within the year. A deep-rooted conviction that special and hidden resources could
invariably be relied upon was holy writ. Whether the public attitude was pure folly or
credulity is difficult to say, but it speaks to some success on the administration's part in
manipulating the aspirations of the ordinary population to acquire a better life.
What went wrong? How bad is it for the future? What are the lessons for the regulation
of international economic activity?
First, we will discuss the postcrisis scenario, then proceed to analyze pivotal strategic
decisions and events preceding the crash. This we do in an effort to speculate about what
the reverse direction, or any other strategically different direction, might have better en-
couraged Russian transformation to a market economy in its first decade of democracy.
Having said this, even altering or reversing mistakes of the recent past will not provide a
sufficient solution, for much weight rests on future decisions and events. Of notable sig-
nificance are the upcoming June 2000 elections, in which President Yeltsin's successor will
be named. When considering how much new leadership or new policy will indeed affect
Russia's second open decade, the timeless adage persists: change occurs slowly.
Postcrisis introspection is important notably in providing domestic incentives to improve
the society as a whole, except that no Russian citizen can ignore the bleak scenario. The
actual recovery of the Russian economy is pitted against a busy political agenda. One year
after the crisis the main surprises are: a rather decent behavior of the ruble, a modest
recovery of the financial market activity, some unexpected survivors in the banking sector,
and some signs of growth in industrial production. How, exactly, has this scenario evolved?
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II. Postcrisis Democratic Russia: 1999-2000
The devaluation of the ruble and the exit or sharp cutting-down of western firms' pres-
ence on the Russian domestic final consumption market has changed the structure of market
demand, which has switched back to local products (when they are available) or to lower-
priced imports from Poland, Turkey or other East European and Baltic States. Some modest
import substitution has emerged, protected by the ruble barrier. Some enterprises are com-
ing out on the visible market from the "shadow market" (many enterprises in Russia prefer
to remain obscure in order to avoid attracting too much attention from organized "Robin
Hood" crime). Also emerging are financial market players who have managed to wrest
themselves from the GKO/OFZ market squeeze.
Some smaller individual investors have survived because their positions before the crash
were insubstantial enough that they could backpedal and reset their market position the
instant that indicators spelled certain loss. But many actors, such as young institutional
investors and portfolio managers, held on until the very end, increasing their detrimental
positions.'
Some reports claim that the average morale of the Russian population today is rather
positive. This contingent supports the assertion that no matter what the difficulties, Rus-
sians are ready to go back to the market and wager still more hope on the recovery of
economic activity, although they adamantly believe that no credit for any recovery will be
attributed to the actions of various governments. Others say that a more accurate picture of
Russian morale today can best be described by malaise and frustration, despite the fact that
most citizens believe that they would not turn back the clock, even if given the chance.
With the volatility of day-to-day Russian events, certainly impatience has mounted to
the point of sociological analysis. In other words, the notion of tomorrow is down-weighted
in comparison to the notion of today. Naturally, instant gratification encourages greed and
speculation-traits many older Russian citizens claim are even worse in their society today
than during Soviet rule. Great hope exists that such mounting greed will bring about posi-
tive internal actions to redress this issue, especially since greed and corruption directly
paralyze effective, constructive entrepreneurial activity. (It is prudent early in these discus-
sions to point out that Russian citizens often expect and even accept calamity because they
associate international embarrassment with subsequent national reform.)
All observers agree today that Russia has not exactly been equal to the task of successfully
achieving the establishment of a market economy within its borders during the last decade.
They worry about the democratic process. This consensus is quite new-prior to the 1998
collapse opinions were more diverse, if not optimistic.
Will history record the first decade of Soviet democracy as a success or failure? Doubtless
the debate will be infinite because it is characteristic that opinions about Russia are rather
polar. Respective opinions are as numerous as dots on a graph and their associated theories
as subtle, yet obvious, as the difference between red caviar and Beluga. Today most Russian
citizens, even cockeyed optimists, are frustrated to the bursting point because they can rarely
find employment or, if employed, expect to receive payment for months. The average male
life expectancy is fifty-two years! Even military employees sell weapons on the black market
to feed their families. For instance, in June 1999, the Russian military agency launched a
1. Vadim Arsen'ev, Finishnaja Prjamaia (The Finishing Line), KOMMERS. DENGI, July 22, 1998, at 36-37.
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massive "employment shrinking" program. This is both a direct result of the 1998 crisis,
the further cutting of government military expenditures in the budget (Primakov's govern-
ment was able to pass through Duma a drastic reduction of expenditures), and a result of
the dismantling of many defense missile sites. The Russian defense sector had been affected
minimally during the nine years of reforms, but was one of the biggest victims of the 1998
crisis.
Needless to say, the average Russian citizen feels that his living conditions have generally
decreased during the last decade. This is correct in some respects. In practical terms, most
of the Russian population's living standards have worsened. Real incomes fell by fifty-five
percent in 1992, after price liberalization, and real wages by forty-two percent by the end
of 1992 as compared to the previous year. The average dollar wage in Russia at the end of
1994 was $94, compared to $200 in Poland and $250 in the Czech Republic. In 1999, the
average dollar wage in Russia was believed to be around $60.
The worsening level of disparity creates mixed feelings of lassitude and malcontent, es-
pecially with regard to the subject of "reforms" or "reformers" and their promises of a
better way of life. The mere mention of "reforms" invites sniggers or outright vocal
cynicism-"here is yet another major farce," however, this attitude should be considered
with caution. Indeed it is fashionable to claim that no real reforms are on the way, that no
reforms have been implemented, that any appearance of reform is only lip service-a show-
case for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). When asked point-blank to recall devel-
opments of the decade and to assess whether or not they would prefer to go back, however,
we reiterate that most reckon that they would not. And this sentiment holds, notwithstand-
ing other mixed feelings toward the new Russian society, including loss of security, shame,
swallowed pride, disgust over widespread corruption, and international loss of position.
President Yeltsin was both widely criticized and held responsible for an endless cortege of
reforms that seemed to go nowhere or, rather, that appeared to profit some happy few: the
weakened central power, the loss of prestige of the nation and its territorial and economic
dismantling, the useless deaths in Chechnya, Dagestan, the chronic arrears in wages, pen-
sions, the crisis and the routing of the banking system, and, above all, implementation of a
personal agenda rather than action to promote the country's best interest.
In political terms, the media and public opinion agree that the president is fully out of
power. And he seems to remain as unpredictable a player as in the past. One wonders,
however, if this enigmatic behavior is a carefully planned tactic or the result of capricious
powerlessness. Even in his difficult situation (including the scandals around his personal
and family affairs), Yeltsin maintained an even stricter commitment toward a general line
of reforms than professed in the past. This exacerbated the belief that only a very strong
presidential power can substantially deter the actions of counter-reform forces. Yeltsin's
agenda created a high ministerial and governmental instability, which is not understood by
the population, and is viewed negatively by the entrepreneurial strata. (There is some move-
ment towards modifying the constitution in order to attenuate disruptive economic con-
sequences of rapid-fire economic changes.)
Recent money-laundering scandals must stimulate reassessment, as the reappraisal of
economic policies reveals some uncomfortable aspects of "financial, advising and consulting
arrangements made with Russia [in recent years]."' What are the consequences for the
2. IRINA Y.o KuzEs & LYNN D. NELSON, RADICAL REFORM IN YELTSIN'S RUSSIA: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC &
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 59 (1995). "Private firms would come on the scene to offer expertise of various types to
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international architecture of such "outlaws"? On the other hand, is it fair to pawn off the
whole 1998 disaster on Russian money-laundering and other forms of self-serving forms
of corruption? Is it fair to simply label Russia an "outlaw"? (We shall later discuss the subject
of Russian corruption.)
Placed in perspective, the changes in recent Russian culture have been rather rapid-fire,
even if considered more gradual than radical. Such environmental changes have aroused
grave uncertainty among Russian citizens about the future. Despite the negative forces in
power during post-World War II Soviet rule, the standard Soviet citizen's life was then
characterized by a remarkable stability.' Prices, labor and political structures remained prac-
tically unchanged. Today's blurred events are, thus, all the more difficult to accept. The
stability of post-World War 1H Russia exacerbates the current general perception that the
newly formed Russian State cares even less about individuals and older generations than
the former Soviet State (if that is possible). Many Russians question whether their restruc-
tured government even constitutes a democracy. A businessman from Perm encapsulates
the general sentiment: "Inflation, ruble instability, unpredictable price rises, political mu-
sical chairs all lead to the absence of any idea of what tomorrow brings and an inability to
plan for the future."4
For example, housing rental agency business in Moscow is often closer to a virtual in-
carnation of Victor Hugo's "middle-age miracle courtyard" than anything else. So caution
is appropriate when assessing buoyant Russian urban businesses. Small entrepreneurial busi-
ness does exist, even if the Mafia attempts to squelch it. Small business is as much alive today
as in the early days of Perestroika, when it started booming, but the problem is acquiring
"clean" credit sources (the few Russian banks in place still offer prohibitively expensive
loans; to accept a "clean" bank loan is about as precarious as borrowing money from the
Mafia itself). Besides the need for "clean" credit security, protective measures must be im-
plemented to propagate any entrepreneurial activity.
A dirty money-laundering investigation is proceeding full scale, with the IMF and World
Bank being the main targets. Sharp critiques about inflation-targeting programs and other
monetarist solutions to crisis and structural transition programs are voiced. The discourse
expressed by Josef Stiglitz on the necessity to go beyond the "Washington Consensus" is
evidence of the intensity of the debate.' Maybe Russia is in no worse shape than other Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries or even some developing countries, al-
though the ensuing reverse of development and industrialization that is in process is disturb-
facilitate Russian economic reform. These activities would often be funded with U.S. dollars-particularly
from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)." Id. Another interesting fact is that: "With so
much aid money involved, there has already been a feeding frenzy in Washington. USAID says 1,200 consul-
tants applied to get into the program, a record for the 33-year-old agency." John J. Fialka, Helping Ourselves,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1994, at Al.
3. See MARIO I. BLEJER & C. COTARELLI, FORCED SAVINGS & REPRESSED INFLATION IN THE SOVIET UNION:
1986-1990 256-86 (IMF Staff Papers, vol. 39, no. 2, 1992). Between 1960 and 1980, the retail price index
(RPI) stayed almost constant, reflecting price controls. See id. Statistics indicate that between 1960 and 1985
prices grew by less than $0.25 percent per year on average. See Vladimir Popov, Central Bank Independence
and Inflation in Russia, Address at the Conference on Central Banks in Eastern Europe and the NIS (1994).
4. THE WORLD BANK, Creating Private Enterprises & Effective Markets, in THE WORLD BANK: STUDIES OF
ECONOMICS IN TRANSFORMATION (.W. Lieberman, J. Nellis, E. Karlova,J. Mukherjee, & S. Rahuja eds., 1995).
5. See Josef Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Con-
sensus, UNU/Wider Lecture (1998).
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ing. The fact remains that the international community cares about the fate of Russia, or
perhaps is afraid of Russia (old fears die hard). More emphatically, some just wonder why the
"market-economy jelly" did not set, a gripping problem for economists and politicians.
Whatever the new consensus is, it cannot be based in Washington. The Washington
Consensus has advocated the use of a small set of instruments, including macroeconomic
stability, liberalized trade, and privatization, to achieve a relatively narrow goal: economic
growth. The post-Washington Consensus recognizes that a broader set of instruments is
necessary and that Russian goals are also much broader. Russia seeks not just increases in
measured GDP, but improved health and education. It seeks sustainable development,
which includes preserving natural resources and maintaining a healthy environment. It seeks
equitable development to ensure that all groups in society, not just those at the top, enjoy
the fruits of development. And it seeks democratic development in which citizens participate
on numerous levels in making the decisions that affect their lives.
If policies are to be sustainable, then, developing and transition countries must claim
ownership of their respective policies. A second principle of a newly emerging consensus
is that a greater degree of humility is called for, which acknowledges the fact that no one
has all the answers. Continued research and discussion, not just between the World Bank
and the IMF but throughout the world, is essential if Russia is to better understand how
to achieve its many goals.
As Earle and Estrin point out, long before the Russian Federation defaulted on Western
bankers in 1990, "[Russia] defaulted on its own citizens, failing to pay wages and entitled
social benefits." 6 Yet an urban fringe of the population has had a taste of "market economy"
and found it savory. Although they sometimes have been carried away when the emerging
Russian market looked so promising, only to be discouraged by the brutal wake-up call of
August 1998, their hopes and dreams of a better life have not lessened. The new diversity
of brand preference appearing on Russian consumers' markets is appreciated for what it is,
even if consumers cannot always afford what is available. Consumers are becoming more
aware of their rights, and sophistication for quality and comparison has begun to form. The
average Russian may or may not believe that there is much hope for a better future, but
his or her conviction is still that Russia is a wealthy "land of opportunities." Cultural,
educational and scientific institutions are highly developed, and yet newspapers report that
per capita GNP (around $1,000) is a little below that of Bolivia.7 The Russian citizen
believes Russia is an industrial nation, but reads in the newspaper that its current exports
consist of almost entirely raw materials (for example, oil, gas and nickel).' Media reports
indicate that perhaps the most important Russian asset is its population, both massive num-
bers of impervious Russian residents who have remained, as well as the valued brainpower
of those who have chosen and managed to leave the country.
History shows that as Yeltsin came to power, radical economic and societal restructuring
initially won out over a gradual approach much praised by Gregory Yavlinski and his fol-
6. J. EARLE & S. ESTRIN, AFTER VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION: THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN
RUSSIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (CEPR Discussion Paper no. 1736, 1998).
7. See Aleksandr Koksharov, Oleg Leonov & Elena Sherbinina, Don't Cry Argentina! Manipulation of Do-
mestic Currency Does Not Guarantee a Way Out of Crises, EXPERT, Aug. 16, 1999, at 12-14.
8. See Vadim Arsen'ev, Structure of the Russian Industry: Ranking of the 150 Most Prominent Russian Firms,
KOMMERS. DENGI, at 3 3-34. The 1998 crisis strongly affected the developing telecom sector in Russia, as well
as electrical giants adversely affected by the increase in import prices and the decline in domestic consumption.
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lowers. But, as mentioned earlier, the real chain of events was dangerously gradual. Thus
the Russian civil society and economic landscape, at the end of the decade, have indelibly
changed. Whether for better or worse, this is subjective. On the economic front, results
are somewhat mitigated. On the civil society front, they seem more promising. Citizens
might be winning a battle-that of getting hold of their rights. The question now is whether
they might actually be able to express this victory in the next elections.
III. Precrisis Democratic Russia (1990-1998)
The path Russia followed throughout the 1990s has indeed moved it hesitantly toward
a transition to both market economy and political harmony. But the chosen (gradual as
opposed to the preferred radical) route has been costly. Russia has faced, and still faces,
deep financial, economic, social, and political difficulties. The Russian population has once
again experienced a number of hardships: food shortages; hyperinflation (1992-1994); a
portentous default on western loans (1990); and two financial near-crashes (1994-1995)
culminating with the 1998 sovereign default. This sequence is directly correlated to social
and income inequalities gaping wider than ever. Other significant realities include: a diz-
zying rise in unemployment; Mafia activity and political coups (August and December 1991,
December 1993); what is perceived by many as "territorial dismantling"; two wars
(Chechnya and Dagestan); numerous border skirmishes (Tadjikistan); and a recent upsurge
of blind terrorism directed at the civilian population. These are but some of the flashbulb
montages straining Russia's framework, since the physical wall came down.
Indications of macroeconomic stabilization were promising in 1997, but thwarted in early
1998 by hit-and-miss policies of the Chernomirdin and Kirienko governments. The state
budget remained in deficit as a result of poor tax collection efforts, large expenditures and
loose regulation over them. Simultaneously the administration continued financing its def-
icit by borrowing even more from internal and external markets. Because Russia's depen-
dence on a consistent flow of foreign capital was heavy, it found itself almost powerless
when the events of Augnst 1998 put an abrupt stop to foreign lending while its other sources
of foreign revenues were depressed on world markets (oil).
Many analysts also emphasize that the reforms undertaken during Perestroika (1985-
1991) made the task of 1990s reformers more difficult. Let us recall some vivid aspects of
the Perestroika era. A legal framework for modifications of a fully centralized economy was
created and, in part, implemented. In 1985-86, campaigns against alcohol and unearned
incomes were waged in response to declining productivity of Soviet workers. In March
1986, a partial reform of agricultural structures was implemented, in effect decentralizing
decisions within state and collective farms (kol- and sovkhozes). In August 1986, a decen-
tralization of foreign trade decisions was also implemented. In January 1988, the Law on
State Enterprises also decentralized decision processes for state firms (followed by a sharp
increase in wages). This first set of legal reforms, then, mainly consisted of decentralizing
the decision-making process in the productive branches (agriculture, industry, services,
handicrafts, and construction), in an effort to revive declining production and productivity.
One must admit that the Russian Federation, emerging out of the collapse of the Soviet
Union in the beginning of the 1990s, inherited a tough legacy-a large-scaled and ultra-
concentrated industrial sector mostly tailored to satisfy defense objectives and the extensive
road and railway network (qualification of the labor force was less emphasized). Many
productive activities were focused on the large defense and military sector. Most sectors
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had been set up according to misguided economic objectives rather than those prevailing
in market economies; location and technology choices did not satisfy market profitability
criteria.9 Neither was production quality a subject of concern. Jakov Urinson, who served
as the first deputy of the Russian Minister of Economy in 1994, says: "We produced absurd
men's coats with stupid astrakhan fur collars, which then remained 10 years in storage.
Clearly our country does not need that kind of growth."' 0
One of the main issues surrounding August 1998 Russia and its shattered economy is
whether the economic policy choices made at the beginning of the 1990s were sound. The
proponents of the implemented reform program insist that reforms did not go far enough
and that most of the industrial sector was irreversibly doomed. The critics emphasize that
heavy weight on monetarist issues proved extremely destructive for the existing Russian
potential, which they deem disorganized, dismembered, and subject to daylight robbery.
Moreover, the latter claim that the monetarist path solved none of the structural problems
diagnosed at the end of the Brezhnev era. These analysts continue attacking monetarism
as one of the main culprits responsible for unexpected features of Russia's actual interna-
tional trade structure. Nelson and Kuzes write:
By 1994 Aslund was insisting that "the structure of Russia's total exports will change towards
larger exports of raw materials." With such statements as part of the public record, it should
not be surprising that a widespread conclusion in the Russia of late 1994 was that the radical
reform agenda included making the Western world safe from potential competition with Rus-
sian products while exploiting the country's natural resources."
But it is all the more surprising because the country is resolutely modern in a "western"
sense. The infrastructure (even if aging) is remarkable, the quality and education of the
labor force in itself distinguishes Russia from developing countries, and the capacity to
adjust to new, imported technologies is excellent, as is research and development of new
products. 2 The words of Nelson and Kuzes ring true for the 1995-1999 period as well.
9. See Richard Ericson, The Structural Barrier to Transition Hidden in Input-Output Tables of Centrally
Planned Economies, ECON. Svs. (forthcoming). "A structure of production location, capital, employment, ma-
terials and energy, etc., had been created without any regard for economic opportunity costs ... This legacy
of the Soviet system constitutes a structure of capital and economic activity that is fundamentally non-viable
in an environment determined by market valuation, and hence requires massive transformation at its very
roots." Id.
10. Jakov Urinson, Kakoi rost nam nuzhen? (What Kind of Growth Do We Need?), EXPERT, Mar. 1998, at 8.
11. Kuzes, supra note 2, at 103.
12. See H. J. Wilson, Restructuring Large Enterprises in Preparation for Privatization: A Case Study, in
CREATING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES & EFFECTIVE MARKETS (1995); see also WORLD BANK, supra note 4. As Wilson,
in his very interesting account of a rare successful restructuring of large Russian military-civilian enterprise,
describes:
Enterprise's hospital products, on the other hand, were in a rapidly growing segment of the
increasingly important medical equipment industry. This relatively new product group offered
good-quality products to both hospitals and patients, with lower costs to all. A few big inter-
national companies had come to dominate the world market and many more wanted to enter.
The Russian market was quickly becoming important, and Enterprise, among a few local
suppliers, became a target for acquisition itself. The transistor radio market was an easy target
for cheap Eastern and Chinese consumer products. While some imports did not offer the same
technical quality, their designs were more attractive, and rapidly gained market shares.
Id. at 162.
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Thus, one cannot help wondering whether the actual policies will lead to a new structure
of specialization and whether the restructuring of industrial potential has started at all.
IV. Private Property in Post-Communist Russia
The legalization of private property and enterprise began with the following steps: the
November 1986 "Law on Individual Labor Activity;" the May 1988 "Law on Cooperatives;"
and the mid-1990 set of laws for "joint stock companies and securities on banking activity
in the USSR and small enterprises."'3
A. THE STATE PROPERTY FUND SET TO HANDLE PRIVATIZATION
The May 1988 "Law on Cooperatives" ruling proved to be quite successful in stimulating
business ventures. It stipulated that any private activity with at least three owners could
qualify as a cooperative and, therefore, make decisions for (act on behalf of) itself (1998-
1999). Thanks to this law, the first wave of entrepreneurial activity was observed. Fifty to
one hundred banks were created as cooperatives. In the early 1980s, three "specialist banks"
had been created to channel credits to enterprises in the agricultural, construction and social
investment sectors, and their subsidiaries extended all over the country: AgropromBank
(APB), Pronstroibank (PSB), and ZhilosotsBank (ZHSB). New cooperative banks served
other branches. Finally, in 1990, the second wave of a banking establishment had become
much linked to the specialized banks of the Perestroika period: over 800 banks emerged-
700 of them regional banks of which 600 were exfilials of specialized banks.I1 Many of these
have been leading the banking sector throughout the past decade.
Aslund writes: "However, these cooperatives became so dynamic that the law was
amended several times in a restrictive direction," a fact that critical observers of post-
Perestroika reforms stress as contrary evidence of the vivacity of small to medium to fully
new, private entrepreneurial activity at that time. I" Other analysts argue that existing state-
enterprise managerial teams had successfully curbed these reforms.
At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was plagued by significant industrial shortages
and rising foreign debt (the Soviet State defaulted on its foreign payments at the end of the
1980s).16 In the beginning of the 1990s, a set of policy choices was rapidly implemented in
the form of an installation manifesting the features of a market economy. These policies
were mainly the result of economic expertise and brainstorming (Sachs, Schleifer, Aslund
and Layers were the main economic advisors at the time). However, financial aid that would
have helped stabilize macroeconomic imbalances and allowed room to maneuver conduct
13. T. Troyanov (Secretan-Troyanov) describes how after arriving in Moscow to establish his Swiss-
Russian law firm, he was offered many symbolic entrees to "Russian joint-venture stock companies"-proof
that a foreign stockholder could be availed of fast and uncomplicated registration.
14. See ANDERS ASLUND, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, How RussIA BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY 1-10
(1995).
15. Id.
16. See PETER AVEN, PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN TRADE REGULATION IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, Eco-
NOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA 81-83 (Anders Aslund ed., 1994). "During 1984-1991, exports from former
USSR territories decreased: sharp decrease in oil extraction, collapse of COMECOM and the shift to mutual
hard currency payments, and the overall depressed world conjuncture. 1991 sees a further slide in exports. On
the other hand, the consumption of imported goods had increased in the USSR during the 1970's." Id.
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of monetary policy after price liberalization failed to materialize. Russia, therefore, pro-
ceeded alone on the course of its first set of reforms: price and trade liberalization, distri-
bution of state property through the voucher scheme (privatization), and a so-called legal
apparatus that would specify private property laws. Many of the current problems, namely
corruption, have also to do with this failed stretched-hand policy from the international
community.
V. Chronology of Events
The early phase of formation of the Russian market (1991-1995) will be discussed in two
subphases: 1991-1992 and 1993-1995, each phase initiating or concluding according to
what we concur to be the starting point of a rather acute financial debacle. Price and
international trade liberalization characterize the first subphase, with the emergence of a
Russian commercial banking system. The second subphase is connected with privatization,
the beginning of financial markets and macroeconomic stabilization attempts involving
financial market structuring. This phase ends in the first market quasi-crash called "Black
Tuesday."
The second phase (1995-1997) characterizes the next deeper wave of liberalization, that
of integration to the world financial markets. Russia becomes the booming emerging market
of the decade and a recipient for "hot money.' 7 This part of the story ends in the crash of
August 17, 1998.
The third, and current, phase (1998-2000) is characterized by a slight distancing from
policies adopted before 1998. With the August 1998 crisis, Russia has experienced a period
of involuntary protectionism (capital market isolation and outflow of "hot money"), and a
relaxing of strict monetary targets (devaluation and controlled devaluation, i.e., the free-
floating ruble is kept under control by open market operations). A restructuring of current
short-term (GKO) debt has been forced upon national and international participants. The
debt-servicing pressure has been relieved due to restructuring, delivery of IMF tranches
and buoyant oil and gas world prices. There are even some positive signs in the economic
landscape. For instance, there is a low-profile revival of financial markets (both stock, and
to a lesser extent, fixed income) while the banking system is rallying. This is accompanied
by an unexpected vitality of consumer-oriented industries, which seem to seize the oppor-
tunities resulting from ruble devaluation and lowered competition to introduce newly de-
signed Russian products (import substitutes).18 Tax receipts have increased relatively to
1998; capital flight is slightly more difficult because of foreign exchange controls. And, in
fact, the economy may be growing modestly, an almost unprecedented occurrence in the
last decade. 19
17. "Hot money" is defined as "excessive funds of short-term capital inflow." HANDBOOK OF EMERGING
FIXED INCOME & CURRENCY MARKETS 199 (Franco J. Fabozzi & Alberto Franco eds., 1999). Liberalization of
capital and trade accounts and relaxation of foreign exchange controls can encourage the flow of hot money
into a system. This scenario may be inflationary and cause authorities significant difficulties in achieving mon-
etary targets. Further, short-term capital tends to flow out of emerging economies during times of political or
economic uncertainty, a process that is destabilizing.
18. The significant downsizing of foreign presence in Russia is clearly due to depressed markets and ruble
devaluation: Procter & Gambles, KPMG, Siemens, Hilti Distributions Ltd., and Merrill Lynch have substan-
tially cut the number of their foreign and local employees.
19. Only in 1997 do Russian statistics show a growth in GDP.
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It seems that the progression towards a Russian market economy has narrowly centered
on working out the notion of private property and understanding its complexities. In this
regard, one must conclude in 1999 that this aspect of the market was significantly, if not
fully, mastered. This progress is quite remarkable in the country where the tradition of
private property weakly rooted before communism and was completely destroyed in its
wake. Formally, all the elements of the market are in place.
VI. Corruption
"Russia's problem is that its reform program has not only been painful but, under Yeltsin,
totally corrupt," writes Thomas L. Friedman.20 He correctly points out that "Yeltsin has
let business clans rip off Russia's gas, oil and minerals, and this wealth has gone to enriching
individuals rather than cushioning the society in transition. That is why reform in Russia
today has such a bad name."
The Washington Post voices a similar view: "Instead of a free-market model, Russia has
become an oligarchy of competing financial, industrial and political clans, interlaced with
criminality, all seeking to extract favors from a state that still clings to its overweening
power.""
We do not deny that corruption is crucial to understanding the Russian reality. But the
current trend is an almost obsessive focus on corruption, making only more delicate a
genuine investigation and assessment of the outcomes (achievements and failures) of a de-
cade of efforts to transform Russia into a market economy. At the expense of being naive
or optimistic, we will concentrate some of our investigation on more positive aspects. More-
over, castigating corruption does not provide new solutions. Corruption may explain some
dimensions of Russian economics and politics. The decrease in GDP, the emergence of the
banking system, the building of financial markets, constitutional reform, dismissal of certain
reformers, Yeltsin's apparent whims, and terrorism, however, are not merely a story about
corruption. Even in Russia one might seek deeper explicative schemes. The contemporary
status of Russia's economy (and its corruption) is the direct result of political options and
policy choices that were implemented when the magnificent "window of opportunity"
opened at the end of the 1980s.11 The general goal, upon which all agreed, was to improve
the economy and the society, but this preliminary agreement left open numerous options
for methods of implementation. Was improvement expected to come through radical or
gradual change? What were the possible policies: Keynesian, monetarist, gradualist, idio-
syncratic, or none of these? Within the debate surrounding Russian transition, where did
positive economy end and normative or ideological choices start? To say blithely that these
are difficult issues is a platitude, yet they form the essence of the current domestic and
international debate over Russia, the 1998 crisis and its general economic failure, a debate
that remains sharply ideological. One cannot ignore this feature; therefore, an objective
assessment of the entire decade's achievements is flatly unreasonable.
Recently Sergej Bodrov, former executive for the Central Bank of Russia, declared that
the commercial banks were then formed by or "closely connected with GOSBank circles,"
20. Thomas L. Friedman, Those Funny Russians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at A2 1.
21. Anders Aslund, WASH. POST (Moscow), Feb. 1996.
22. GRAHAM T. ALLISON & GRIGORII YAVLINSKII, WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: THE GRAND BARGAIN FOR
DEMOCRACY IN THE SOVIET UNION (1991).
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and that the main reason for their emergence was to enable highly ranked civil servants to
conduct recently "decentralized" foreign trade operations as well as businesses of their
own.
3 Many in Moscow claim that this period coincides with the first wave of rapid ac-
cumulation of almost overnight fortunes in 1990-1991, combining legal framework and
initial price liberalization initiated by Yegor Gaidar in the mid-1990s.
The initial capital for creating many such businesses was acquired from connections
within both the "Soviet banking sector" and industry connections (abroad, if possible). The
principal mechanism was arbitrage.14
The late Soviet State had implemented hundreds of currency coefficients-individualized
exchange rates specific to goods and enterprises, with a central system of hard currency
distribution. Further, a double accounting system existed for sovereign currency: there were
"cash rubles" (nalichnyie) and "noncash" accounting rubles (beznalicbnyie) with an internal,
informal, exchange rate of 2:1. Lastly, there was access to subsidized state production whose
world price was substantially higher. Anders Aslund offers the following theory:
For instance in early 1990, the Soviet wholesale price of a ton a crude oil was 30 rubles. This
also happened to be the free market price of a package of Marlboro cigarettes. The black
market rate of nalichnyie to beznalicbnyie was 1:3. With the right connections it was possible to
buy three tons of crude oil for one package of Marlboro cigarettes (less than $1), when the
world market price of one ton of crude oil was in excess of $100.25
People allowed to "exchange" noncash rubles for cash rubles or who had license to get
hold of hard currency cash (an extremely difficult coup at the time) or who were well
connected with a particularly interesting "extractive" sector of the ministry (i.e., a special-
ized commercial bank) were privy to such arbitrage opportunities. One must mention,
however, that not only purely speculative schemes were appearing: according to L.D. Wein-
berg, Russian businessman and CEO of the Siberian Ore and Mining Bank, many computer
programming businesses, which were successfully subcontracting to Western firms, made
a nice and quick profit.
An interesting view on the Russian entrepreneurship has been presented by Vladimir
Potanin, once considered the archetypal oligarch (robber baron). He clearly positions him-
self as a clear-sighted entrepreneur operating for the future of Russia's market economy
and declares:
The Russian business elite should be open on two fronts: it should not only work with foreign
capital, but also with the budding "second wave" businesses. We should take them in our club,
give them access to investment resources, give them, if necessary and needed, political pro-
tection (prikrytie). In two to three years from now, medium businesses-"Oneksim," "Inkom-
bank," "Al'fa," "Menatep," "Most"-won't be needing us. They will have built their own
financial networks with foreign banks, which will view them as interesting partners. We need
now to succeed in our first step towards [assisting] these companies and as long as we are still
useful to them-help them develop their businesses.2 6
As to an infamous recent money-laundering scandal, it may never be untangled.
23. Sergej Bodrov, Mamai Has Not Left Yet: Offering an Insider View on the Problems of the Banking System,
SOVETSKAIA RoSSiA, Aug. 14, 1999, at 2.
24. Anders Aslund, Russia's Collapse, FOREIGN AF., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 42.
25. Aslund, supra note 21.
26. Tatiana Lysova, The Reform of the Oligarchs, EXPERT, Mar. 1998, at 14-16.
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Elaborate shell games have become a dominant feature of Russia's post-Soviet economy...
Government officials are now looking into whether Menatep [Bank] was used to move funds
through accounts at Bank of New York linked to Benex Worldwide Ltd., a Russian firm that
investigators have already said has ties to a major alleged Russian mobster ... Now federal
and international law-enforcement officials say they are looking into whether Mr. Kagalovsky
[Menatep's first deputy chairman] helped construct a Byzantine network of offshore corpora-
tions that politically connected or mob-linked Russians may have used to siphon hundreds of
millions of dollars out of the country. Included in that sum, investigators say, may have been
many millions of foreign aid and funds pumped into Russia by Mr. Kagalovsky's old employer,
the IMF, to shore up the reeling Russian economy. 7
Interestingly, Mr. Kagalovsky in his recent column for a Russian newspaper notes: "It's
high time now to remember two old truths: The end doesn't justify the means and a state
based on corruption and theft is, as a rule, far less effective than an ordinary normal state."
He added, "The IMF can't pull out of Russia, but should give it as little money as possible."2
VII. Conclusion
Many either praise the patience of the Russian people or criticize their apathy. This
absence of sentiment is only apparent. The Russian's interest in building a new societal
model was, and is, strong despite the fact that there seems to be little evidence yet of an
emerging comprehensive program for correcting the flaws of a "dual" economy. It is hoped
that the past decade of hardship has brought about a new political and social maturity. The
process is slow, but persistent. Although many parameters have changed, the goals in 1999
are the same as they were a decade ago: to achieve modernization, conversion and growth.
New political teams will be faced with achieving progress toward these ends, but the task
may likely prove more difficult following the events of 1998 and 1999 because Russia's
credit market is tighter now than ever and the banking system, as a functional structure, is
routed.
In the late Soviet system, the average nondissident citizen was infantilized. A subtle system
of mixing reward with penalty had been imbedded in Russia's psyche that provided for a
secure but somewhat decisionless, incentiveless social and working environment. How was
anyone reasonably to expect, then, that in such a short period of time Russian citizens would
seize the full right of their powers and duties?
In large towns, modest, but firm, evidence hints of a change in mentalities, manifested
by more active behavior of a small segment of citizens. Consumers in Moscow have begun
fighting for their rights by taking legal actions. These actions are cumbersome, but many
cases have been successful. This is but another sign that alternatives to corruption exist in
Russia as well.29 It remains costly to the citizen, but feasible. Exposure to new concepts has
27. M. Allen et al., Brash Banker's Tangled Deals Become a Focus of Money-Laundering Probes, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 26, 1999.
28. Id.
29. A similar attitude appeared in the young executive layer in Bogota, Colombia (another country where
corruption is rather the rule than the exception): young lawyers, central bank economists, and young Colombian
entrepreneurs are realizing that the best way to fight corruption is to work within the legal framework. The
results are encouraging, though it becomes a challenge to win a case legally. Recent informal discussions with
young Russian executives confirm that the formulation of the "stake" is identical-indicating a love of the
game, risk-taking, or perhaps a budding consciousness of one's right.
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persuaded the urban population that a financial and banking system that functions well is
quite useful in terms of life-cycle consumption and savings decisions. The notions of private
insurance, pension funds, and their ability to smooth future consumption have been equally
(more broadly) understood and awakened the interest of the Russian urban middle class
(not talking about the "new Russians"). An article recently discussed the fate of Vladimir
Potanin's efforts to set up the first private insurance companies in Russia: Renaissance-
Straxovanie (insurance), Interros-Soglasie and the Interros-Doitsoinstvo (pension fund).3 0
The crisis has not been able to bring them down totally: "There have been heavy losses
but they are not dead." Of course, the confidence in such companies is not high. But the
interest is still there, nonetheless. As soon as the legal framework will be able to guarantee
some transparency in the working of financial and banking companies, there should be no
difficulty in regaining the population's interest.
Because of the 1998 crisis, Russian consumers are less vulnerable to fraudulent schemes
than in the past. For example, the summer 1994 financial scandal of the AOA-MMM Mos-
cow fund is still alive in people's memories. This "fund," directed by Sergei Mavrodi, who
proved to be a masterful swindler, promised huge returns on what was later revealed to be
unsound securities. The operation was successful. Mavrodi allegedly spent several hundred
million to advertise his fund and was able to attract a considerable number of investors.
The investors' gullibility may be softened by the fact that the AOA-MMM fund was betting
on the similarity (a deliberate choice by Mavrodi) of its name with the MMVMinvest fund
that had set up a rather sound share fund and a GKO fund. Mavrodi was arrested, but then
released and wound up being elected to the Duma. Stories of other fraudulent schemes
abound: the Russkii Dom Selenga ("Selling") company, neither registered as an investment
fund or licensed for securities, attracted 1.5 million depositors."
The reader might find these signs extremely tenuous (or even flimsy). And one cannot
deny that anything can happen in Russia tomorrow or the next day or the next! But it seems
that the country seems more poised today for a new, more realistic and pragmatic social
and political contract than it was a decade ago. The decade has in a way been won, although
at a terribly high price and certainly not as triumphantly as participators and spectators
would have hoped. The U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers notes:
It is certainly true that in this new global economy, the market punishment for bad policies
comes more quickly and takes a harsher form. But the reverse is also true that good policies
are rewarded much more quickly. That is the positive lesson for Russia that can be gleaned
from experiences in Mexico and elsewhere."
Russia faces tremendous challenges in the months ahead. But it is also an opportunity to
address Russia's fundamental economical and political problems. The Russian voters must
make their voices heard more loudly and clearly this time, so that the country and its people
do not miss the next "window of opportunity."
30. See Lysova, supra note 26.
31. See M. KAZER, PRIVATIZATION IN THE CIS, CHALLENGES FOR RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORMS 81-97 (A.
Smith ed., 1995).
32. Lawrence Summers, Russia & The United States: The Economic Agenda, Address at the U.S.-Russia
Investment Symposium (Jan. 14, 1999).
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